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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this interlocutory appeal, the defendant appeals the 
District Court's denial of a motion for summary judgment 
in a section 1983 action where the defendant asserted the 
defense of qualified immunity. What is unusual her e is the 
setting -- a public university. In an amended complaint, a 
tenured professor alleged that he was suspended from 
teaching a class after he refused the university president's 
instruction to change a student's grade and that he was 
discharged after submitting a written criticism of the 
president to be presented to the university board of 
trustees. According to the complaint, these wer e acts of 
retaliation which violated the professor's rights to academic 
freedom and free speech protected by the First Amendment. 
We conclude that the amended complaint did not allege 
deprivations of constitutional rights and that summary 
judgment should have been granted. We ther efore will 
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reverse the portion of the District Court's judgment that 
dealt with these issues and remand for the District Court to 
enter summary judgment for the defendant university 
president. 
 
When an appellate court reviews the denial of a 
defendant's claim to qualified immunity, "the appealable 
issue is a purely legal one: whether the facts alleged . . . 
support a claim of violation of clearly established law." 
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 n.9 (1985).1 Resolving 
the legal issues, however, requir es "consideration of the 
factual allegations that make up the plaintif f 's claim for 
relief." Id at 528. For this r eason, we present the facts as 
they have been alleged by the plaintiff and do not concern 
ourselves with weighing the correctness of the plaintiff 's 
version. Id. Our review is plenary. Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 
F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
I. 
 
For twenty-eight years, plaintiff Robert Br own was 
employed as a professor at California University of 
Pennsylvania; he has been tenured since 1972. At the 
conclusion of the spring 1994 semester, the plaintiff 
assigned an "F," or "failing," grade to one of his students in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Although 28 U.S.C. S 1291 confers jurisdiction upon the courts of 
appeals to hear appeals from final decisions of district courts, the 
collateral order doctrine creates an exception to the general rule. In re 
Montgomery County, 215 F.3d 367, 373 (3d Cir. 2000); Mitchell v. 
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). 
 
The parties briefed the issue of the defendant's qualified immunity, but 
the District Court did not explicitly address the question. When it 
concluded that summary judgment was not appr opriate, however, the 
Court implicitly ruled on the matter. Even though a district court does 
not explicitly address the immunity claims, we nonetheless have 
jurisdiction to review the implied denial of those claims. In re 
Montgomery County, 215 F.3d at 373. "[A] district court's denial of a 
claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of 
law, is an appealable `final decision' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment." Behrens v. 
Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 306 (1996) (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530); 
Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F .3d 190, 197 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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a practicum course because the student had attended only 
three of fifteen class sessions. Defendant Angelo Armenti, 
the university president, ordered that the grade be changed 
to "Incomplete," but the plaintiff r efused. 
 
The plaintiff alleged that, as a result of his refusal, the 
university suspended him from teaching the course. He 
further contended that "[a]s a result of this and other 
matters, the plaintiff wrote a critical r eview of Defendant 
Armenti for presentation to the University Board of 
Trustees." Two years later, the university terminated the 
plaintiff 's employment. 
 
The plaintiff then filed a sixteen-count complaint in a 
Pennsylvania state court, naming Armenti and thirty-one 
other individuals or entities as defendants. The complaint 
alleged violations of state law as well as of federal and state 
constitutional law. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1446(d), the 
case was removed to the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Pennsylvania. 2 By the time the 
District Court considered the motion for summary 
judgment now before us, the only claims r emaining for 
disposition were federal civil rights violations alleged 
against several defendants including Armenti, and a civil 
rights retaliation claim against Armenti alone. Count V in 
the complaint stated the retaliation claim against Armenti: 
 
       "80. Defendant Armenti retaliated against Plaintiff 
       because Plaintiff refused to change a student's grade at 
       the order of Defendant Armenti, in violation of 
       Plaintiff 's right to academic free expression, in 
       violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to 
       the United States Constitution. 
 
       81. Defendant Armenti retaliated against Plaintiff for 
       Plaintiff 's critical review of Defendant Armenti for the 
       Board of Trustees in violation of Plaintiff 's right to free 
       speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to 
       the United States Constitution." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Because plaintiff alleged claims arising under the Constitution and the 
laws of the United States, the District Court's jurisdiction was proper 
under 28 U.S.C. S 1331. 
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The District Court granted summary judgment as to all 
the claims except for those in Count V. The District Court 
denied defendant Armenti's motion for summary judgment 
as to the Count V claims, concluding that both the 
plaintiff 's criticism of Armenti and the plaintiff 's 
assignment of student grades were protected speech under 
the First Amendment. The District Court did not addr ess 
the defendant's claim to qualified immunity. The defendant 
filed a timely appeal, asserting again that qualified 
immunity provides him a defense to the Count V claims. 
 
II. 
 
The doctrine of qualified immunity establishes"that 
government officials performing discretionary functions 
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar 
as their conduct does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a r easonable 
person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
800, 818 (1982). This doctrine is founded upon the 
recognized "need to protect officials who are required to 
exercise their discretion and the r elated public interest in 
encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority." Id. 
at 807 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
 
We have held that the defendant is entitled to the defense 
of qualified immunity if none of the following questions can 
be answered in the affirmative: (1) have the plaintiffs 
alleged a violation of their statutory or constitutional rights; 
(2) was the right alleged to have been violated clearly 
established in the existing law at the time of the violation; 
and (3) should a reasonable official have known that the 
alleged action violated the plaintiffs' rights. Rouse v. 
Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 196-97 (3d Cir . 1999). The 
threshold-nature of the inquiry serves tofilter unfounded 
claims and "promotes clarity in the legal standards for 
official conduct, to the benefit of both the officers and the 
general public." Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) 
(citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 840- 
42 n.5 (1998)); Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1990) 
("Decision of [the] purely legal [immunity] question[s] 
permits courts expeditiously to weed out suits which fail 
the test without requiring a defendant who rightly claims 
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qualified immunity to engage in expensive and time 
consuming preparation to defend the suit on its merits."). 
We turn, therefore, to the question of whether First 
Amendment rights were violated.3 
 
III. 
 
The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment 
prohibits the government from r egulating speech based 
upon its substantive content or the message it conveys. 
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 
515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995). Here, we must consider whether 
the alleged actions of the defendant, the pr esident of a 
public university, had the effect of discouraging speech 
with a disfavored message and, therefor e, amounted to an 
improper conditioning of public employment. The plaintiff 
has alleged two acts of retaliation and two theories 
supporting First Amendment protection of his speech. First, 
he asserts that retaliation following the plaintiff 's refusal to 
change the grade violated a right to academic fr ee 
expression under the First Amendment. Second, the 
plaintiff contends that the defendant's firing him for 
submitting a written criticism violated the generalized free 
speech rights under the First Amendment. We will consider 
these arguments in turn. 
 
A. 
 
Employees of federal and state government do not 
relinquish their First Amendment rights to comment on 
matters of public interest as a condition of their 
government employment. Pickering v. Boar d of Education, 
391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). Nor do "students or teachers 
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate." T inker v. Des Moines 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The First Amendment states that "Congr ess shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech . . . ." The Fourteenth Amendment 
applies this provision of the Bill of Rights to the States. Gitlow v. 
People 
of State of New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). In Monroe v. Pape, 365 
U.S. 167 (1961), the Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C. S 1983 creates 
a remedy for violations of rights secur ed by the Constitution or the laws 
of the United States. Id. at 172. 
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School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1968). Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court has held that the university setting is one 
in which First Amendment free speech pr otections in that 
context are of particular importance: 
 
       The essentiality of freedom in the community of 
       American universities is almost self-evident. No one 
       should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that 
       is played by those who guide and train our youth. T o 
       impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders 
       in our colleges and universities would imperil the 
       future of our Nation. 
 
Sweezy v. State of New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 
(1957). 
 
These statements notwithstanding, there ar e recognized 
limitations upon free speech in the university setting. For 
example, we held in Edwards v. Califor nia University of 
Pennsylvania, 156 F.3d 488, 491 (3d Cir . 1998), that "a 
public university professor does not have a First 
Amendment right to decide what will be taught in the 
classroom." 
 
In Edwards, a university professor alleged a violation of 
his First Amendment rights when the school disciplined 
him after a series of disputes with the administration over 
course curriculum. Id. at 490. We concluded that no 
violation occurred because in the classr oom, the university 
was the speaker and the professor was the agent of the 
university for First Amendment purposes. Id. at 491. In 
support of this conclusion, the Edwards  opinion quoted 
from the Supreme Court opinion in Rosenberger: 
 
       [w]hen the state is the speaker, it may make content- 
       based choices. When the University determines the 
       content of the education it provides, it is the University 
       speaking, and we have permitted the gover nment to 
       regulate the content of what is or is not expr essed 
       when it is the speaker or when it enlists private entities 
       to convey its own message . . . . It does not follow, 
       however, . . . that viewpoint-based r estrictions are 
       proper when the University does not speak itself or 
       subsidize transmittal of a message it favors but instead 
       expends funds to encourage a diversity of views fr om 
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       private speakers. A holding that the University may not 
       discriminate based on viewpoint of private persons 
       whose speech it facilitates does not restrict the 
       University's own speech, which is controlled by 
       different principles. 
 
Id. at 491-92 (quoting Rosenberger , 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 
Edwards distinguished the rights of a professor in the 
classroom from those out of the classr oom. Id. at 492. "In 
the classroom" refers to those settings where the professor 
is acting as the university's proxy, fulfilling one of the 
functions involved in the university's "four essential 
freedoms:" choosing "who may teach, what may be taught, 
how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study." 
Id. at 492 (citing Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978)). Because grading is pedagogic, 
the assignment of the grade is subsumed under the 
university's freedom to determine how a course is to be 
taught. We therefore conclude that a public university 
professor does not have a First Amendment right to 
expression via the school's grade assignment pr ocedures. 
 
The plaintiff 's argument to the contrary relies upon the 
analysis adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit in Parate v. Isibor, 868 F .2d 821 (6th Cir. 1989). In 
Parate, a non-tenured professor was forced to sign a 
memorandum changing a student's grade. Id. at 823-34. He 
was not permitted to note on the document that the change 
was "per instructions from [the] Dean . . . ." Id. The Court 
held that a professor's First Amendment right was violated 
because the "assignment of a letter grade is a symbolic 
communication intended to send a specific message to the 
student . . . [and] is entitled to some measur e of First 
Amendment protection." Id. at 827 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. 
at 505-06). The Court concluded that the University was 
the speaker only as far as the grade on the student's 
transcript. Id. at 829. 
 
The Edwards framework, however , applies to the present 
case and offers a more realistic view of the university- 
professor relationship. Whether the school registrar is told 
that a student's performance rates an"F " or an 
"Incomplete" is not a matter that warrants the"intrusive 
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oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First 
Amendment." Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983); 
Wozniak v. Conry, 236 F.3d 888, 891 (7th Cir. 2001) ("Some 
universities offer their faculty more control over grading 
than [in this case] and maybe discretion is good. But 
competition among systems of evaluation at dif ferent 
universities, not federal judges, must settle the question 
which approach is best."). We note that our holding today 
is consistent with at least one other Court of Appeals. See 
Lovelace v. Southern Methodist University, 739 F.2d 419, 
426 (2d Cir. 1986) (per curiam). 
 
B. 
 
In his second argument, the plaintiff asserts that 
retaliation following his submission of a critical evaluation 
violated his free speech rights under the First Amendment. 
When resolving such disputes, courts must strike "a 
balance between the interests of the [employee], as a 
citizen, in commenting upon the matters of public concern 
and the interest of the State, as an employer , in promoting 
the efficiency of the public services it per forms through its 
employees" when determining whether a public employer 
acted properly in discharging an employee for engaging in 
speech. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. The thr eshold question 
in this analysis is whether the employee's speech may fairly 
be characterized as a matter of public concer n. Rankin v. 
McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987). 
 
In Connick v. Myers, a District Attor ney fired an Assistant 
District Attorney for distributing a questionnaire to fellow 
staff members. 461 U.S. at 141. The survey sought staff 
views on the office transfer policy, office morale, the need 
for a grievance committee, the level of confidence in 
supervisors, and whether employees felt pressur ed to work 
in political campaigns. Id. 
 
The Court reiterated the balancing described in Pickering, 
this time addressing a single question in the analysis: 
whether the subject of the employee's expression was " `a 
matter of legitimate public concern' upon which `free and 
open debate is vital to informed decision-making by the 
electorate.' " Id. at 145 (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571- 
72). The Court reasoned that if the employee's speech 
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       cannot be fairly characterized as constituting speech 
       on a matter of public concern, it is unnecessary for us 
       to scrutinize the reasons for her dischar ge. When 
       employee expression cannot be fairly consider ed as 
       relating to any matter of political, social, or other 
       concern to the community, government officials should 
       enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without 
       intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the 
       First Amendment. 
 
Id. at 146 (internal footnote omitted). The Court pointed to 
the standard applied in the common law tort for invasion of 
privacy as the correct standard to apply when determining 
whether an expression is of a kind that is of legitimate 
concern to the public. Id. at 143 n.5 (citing Cox 
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)). The Cox 
standard for determining whether a topic is a legitimate 
matter of public concern is functional, asking whether 
there is a public benefit in reporting the matter. 420 U.S. at 
495. 
 
In Connick, the Court concluded that "[w]hether an 
employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern 
must be determined by the content, for m, and context of a 
given statement, as revealed by the whole r ecord." Id. at 
148-49. The Court concluded that all but one of the 
questions on the survey dealt with the individual 
employee's dispute with the District Attorney and were not 
"of public import in evaluating the perfor mance of the 
District Attorney as an elected official." Id. at 148. Because 
the questionnaire concerned matters of public interest "in 
only a most limited sense . . . [t]he limited First 
Amendment interest involved here does not require that 
[the employer] tolerate action which he r easonably believed 
would disrupt the office, undermine his authority, and 
destroy close working relationships." Id. at 154. 
 
Four years later, in Rankin v. McPherson  the Supreme 
Court considered the question again -- whether a 
statement by an employee that led to her firing was a 
matter of public concern. 483 U.S. at 384. The employee in 
Rankin worked in a constable's office and had remarked 
after hearing of an attempt on the life of the Pr esident, "If 
they go for him again, I hope they get him." Id at 379. In 
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determining the "public concern" threshold test, the Court 
reasoned that because the statement was made in the 
context of a discussion about the policies of the Pr esident's 
administration, and because it was said following a news 
bulletin of national interest, it "plainly dealt with a matter 
of public concern." Id. at 386. 
 
Whether the subject matter of the "speech" was a 
legitimate matter of public concern is a question of law. 
Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.7. The fact that the matter now 
on appeal is a legal issue distinguishes the pr esent 
interlocutory appeal from that in Johnson v. Jones, 515 
U.S. 304 (1995). In deciding Johnson, the Court resolved a 
circuit split in the courts of appeals "about the immediate 
appealability of . . . pretrial `evidence insufficiency' claims 
made by public official defendants who assert qualified 
immunity defenses." Johnson, 515 U.S. at 308. Although 
there is some broad language in Johnson that might 
suggest the Court foreclosed any consideration of the 
sufficiency of the evidence when courts of appeals review 
summary judgment motions, the Court limited the holding 
in at least two ways. First, it noted that the decision did not 
change the law for many courts of appeals.4 Johnson, 515 
U.S. at 307, 318, 319 (observing that "our holding here has 
been the law in several Circuits for some time" and 
referring to a listing of cases that included Giuffre v. Bissell, 
31 F.3d 1241 (3d Cir. 1994)). Second, the Court 
acknowledged that where a district court does not clearly 
state facts relevant to a question of law, it might be 
appropriate for a court of appeals to "undertake a 
cumbersome review of the record to determine what facts 
the district court . . . likely assumed." Id . at 319. In 
addition, the Supreme Court recently clarified the holding 
in Johnson: 
 
       Johnson held, simply, that determinations of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We had held in Giuffre v. Bissell, 31 F.3d 1241 (3d Cir. 1994), that a 
claim that "I didn't do it" is differ ent than a claim to the right of 
qualified 
immunity and that a denial of summary judgment motion based on the 
former is not appealable. Id. at 1258 (citing Burns v. County of Cambria, 
971 F.2d 1015, 1019 (3d Cir. 1992)). Our holding in Giuffre is consistent 
with the later opinion by the Supreme Court. 
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       evidentiary sufficiency at summary judgment ar e not 
       immediately appealable merely because they happen to 
       arise in a qualified-immunity case; if what is at issue 
       in the sufficiency determination is nothing more than 
       whether the evidence could support a finding that 
       particular conduct occurred, the question decided is 
       not truly "separable" from the plaintif f 's claim, and 
       hence there is no "final decision" under Cohen and 
       Mitchell. Johnson reaffir med that summary judgment 
       determinations are appealable when they resolve a 
       dispute concerning an "abstract issu[e] of law" relating 
       to qualified immunity -- typically, the issue whether 
       the federal right was "clearly established." 
 
Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313 (1996) (citations 
omitted). 
 
In Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, 98 F .3d 116 (3d Cir. 1996), 
we observed that "crucial to the resolution of any assertion 
of qualified immunity is a careful examination of the record 
(preferably by the district court) to establish, for purposes 
of summary judgment, a detailed factual description of the 
action of each individual defendant." Id. at 122. We have 
also noted that although the qualified immunity inquiry is 
primarily legal, "some factual allegations . . . are necessary 
to resolve the immunity question." Gruenke v. Seip, 225 
F.3d 290, 299 (3d Cir. 2000). Ther efore, Johnson does not 
foreclose an appellate court from scrutinizing the evidence 
put forward by the plaintiff following a qualified immunity 
summary judgment motion. 
 
The role of a factual inquiry resolving a claim to qualified 
immunity is addressed in Anderson v. Cr eighton, 483 U.S. 
635 (1987). In Creighton, the Supr eme Court considered 
whether an officer was liable for conducting an 
unreasonable search if a reasonable officer could have 
believed that the search was lawful. Id. at 637. The Court 
required a particular inquiry, stating that the "relevant 
question in this case . . . is the objective (albeit fact- 
specific) question whether a reasonable officer could have 
believed Anderson's warrantless search to be lawful, in light 
of clearly established law and the information the searching 
officers possessed." Id. at 641. The Court vacated the 
judgment and remanded the case with specific instructions 
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that any discovery "should be tailored specifically to the 
question of Anderson's qualified immunity." Id. at 646 n.6. 
 
Creighton instructs that "the balance that our cases 
strike between the interests in vindication of citizens' 
constitutional rights and in public officials' ef fective 
performance of their duties," id . at 639, requires plaintiffs 
to respond to a defendant's claim of qualified immunity 
with evidence that the actions alleged "ar e actions that a 
reasonable officer could have believed [un]lawful." Id. at 
646 n.6. As a result, a respondent does not satisfy the Rule 
56(e) burden by relying upon bare allegations or assertions 
of abstract rights. If the defendant official is liable only 
where "[t]he contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that 
a reasonable official would understand that what he is 
doing violates that right," id. at 640, it is reasonable for a 
court considering a qualified immunity summary judgment 
motion to require that the plaintif f make clear what the 
alleged violation is. Where plaintiff fails to present 
particularized facts, the motion should be granted. 5 
 
In the present case, it is clear that the plaintiff did not 
satisfy Creighton. The District Court conceded that it did 
not know the content of the speech at issue. The r ecord 
contains only two clues about the content of the evaluation: 
the assertion in the complaint that the plaintif f 's evaluation 
was "critical," and the plaintiff 's testimony that the 
evaluation was submitted on a two-page form that "had 
room to respond to four or five dif ferent things that had to 
do with academic standards and faculty morale and how 
the president dealt with various issues on campus." 
Although his deposition testimony indicates that he had 
access to a copy of the completed evaluation for m, he did 
not enter the document into the record. Nor does the 
plaintiff disclose the substance of his comments on the 
form, saying only that he did not choose the subjects, but 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. This is not a weighing of evidence for a deter mination of whether 
there 
is a genuine issue of fact, such as the Court held was not appealable in 
Johnson, because the legal question here is separable from the inquiry 
that is the basis of the plaintiff 's claim. Behrens, 516 U.S. at 313. 
Rather, the requirement prevents the clever plaintiff from bypassing the 
qualified immunity "filter" simply by identifying an abstract right. 
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that his was "a response to an evaluation form that I had 
been given." 
 
It is the words that the plaintiff wr ote on the form that 
allegedly motivated the retaliation. When considering a 
summary judgment motion, a court must have befor e it the 
"content, form, and context of a given statement, as 
revealed by the whole record" to determine if the 
statements were of legitimate public concer n. The plaintiff 
did not provide such proof, alleging only that the speech 
was "critical." In the absence of evidence, the District Court 
improperly inferred that the speech addr essed "academic 
integrity." By failing to require the proof, the District Court 
allowed the plaintiff "to convert the rule of qualified 
immunity . . . into a rule of virtually unqualified liability 
simply by alleging violations of extremely abstract rights." 
Creighton, 483 U.S. at 639. 
 
Finally, even if we were convinced that the plaintiff 's 
response to the summary judgment motion satisfied 
Creighton, we conclude that summary judgment would have 
been appropriate nonetheless. On the facts found by the 
District Court, the subject of the plaintiff 's speech closely 
resembles that of the questions on the survey in Connick. 
Those dealt with office morale, the transfer policy, and 
employee confidence in supervisors. Connick , 461 U.S. at 
141. The District Court here reasoned that the issues 
contained speech which was in the category of "academic 
integrity," "relevant to the gover ning of the University, and 
therefore, . . . of public concern," but this is comparable to 
the dissent in Connick concluding that the issues there 
"could reasonably be expected to be of inter est to persons 
seeking to develop informed opinions about the manner in 
which . . . an elected official . . . dischar ges his 
responsibilities." Id. at 163 (Br ennan, J., dissenting). Had 
the plaintiff been reprimanded for speaking regarding, for 
example, grade inflation, a specific subject about which 
there is demonstrated interest, he might have satisfied this 
test. As it stands, the speech alleged reflects little more 
than one employee's dissatisfaction with an administrative 
decision by his employer, Connick, 461 U.S. at 148-49. As 
such, there would be no public benefit in r eporting this 
matter, Cox, 420 U.S. at 495, and wefind no constitutional 
violation. 
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IV. 
 
We conclude that the defendant is entitled to qualified 
immunity as to Count V because no actual constitutional 
violation was alleged. For this reason, that portion of the 
judgment of the District Court on appeal will be r eversed 
and on remand the District Court will be instructed to enter 
summary judgment for the defendant university pr esident. 
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